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Abstract 
I discuss the rhetorical dimensions of bounded rationality in two different, 
yet related, contexts, namely in the practice of organizational economists 
and in Herbert Simon’s key attempts to persuade economists to take 
bounded rationality seriously, his Ely lecture and his Nobel Prize lecture.  
I discuss various reasons why Simon failed to convince his 
contemporaries, among other things, the absence of clear definitions of 
bounded rationality and heuristics for incorporating it into economic 
models.  Simon’s failures in these respects help explaining the very 
modest, and mainly “rhetorical,” use of bounded rationality in the works 
of organizational economists.   
Keywords: Herbert Simon, bounded rationality, organizational 
economics, rhetoric. 
JEL classification: B41, D23, L2, M1 
I. Introduction1 
In this chapter I make a couple of connected arguments about the status of bounded 
rationality (henceforth, “BR”) in modern economics and the role of Herbert Simon 
with respect to understanding this status.  Following McCloskey (1983), emphasis is 
placed on the rhetorical aspects, the attempts to persuade, of scientific development 
in economics. Following Mirjam-Sent’s (1997) fine study of Thomas Sargent’s 
(rhetorical) appeal to BR, economists’ actual use of BR is examined.  The economists 
whose use of BR I consider are economists of organization.  This choice is far from 
arbitrary:  In his key papers directed at an economics audience (Simon 1978, 1979), 
Simon made several explicit references to the emerging economics of organization 
and he himself contributed fundamentally to the neighboring field of organization 
theory. His examples of BR and its implications usually involved the business firm. 
Indeed, he sometimes took the notion of “administrative man” to be synonymous with 
a boundedly rational agent. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the economics of 
organization was probably the first sub-field of economics where BR was 
systematically invoked, and it is perhaps still today the sub-field it is still being 
invoked with the highest frequency.2  
 More specifically, it will, first, be argued that the use of BR arguments in the 
economics of organization is primarily rhetorical in the somewhat pre-McCloskeyan 
(McCloskey 1983) sense of a dressing up a theory with arguments that are essentially 
empty in an explanatory sense, but are nevertheless made because they help to 
persuade.  Specifically, BR is invoked in the rhetorical practice of organizational 
economists, because it represents a way of conveying the intuition of another, much 
more central point; however, it is not invoked because it itself is in any way central.  
Specifically, BR is used in order to explain in a loose, background way the notion of 
contractual incompleteness.  Thus, if people do not have the wits to imagine and 
                                                 
1 The comments of Mie Augier are gratefully acknowledged. 
2 Game theorists may refer to BR more frequently, but game theory is hardly a distinct sub-field in 
economics; rather, a workshop that supplies machine tools to the various fields.   
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make contractual provision for a number of contingencies, they will leave the 
contract incomplete, giving rise to the kind of externality problems that drive the 
modern economics of organization. However, asymmetric information (a well-
defined concept) can do, in these models, what BR (a concept with a multitude of 
different connotations, but arguably no clear definition) supposedly does, and can do 
so more “cleanly” (Section II, “Economists’ Use of Bounded Rationality: the Case of 
Organizational Economics”).  This raises the question why BR continues to be invoked, 
a question that leads to the second argument.      
 Second, I argue, admittedly in a more speculative vein, that there are strong 
reasons to suspect that the status as well as the rhetorical practice of Herbert Simon 
play a decisive role for understanding the way in which BR is presently used.  The 
fact that a Nobel Prize was bestowed upon Simon for his work on BR, and that it was 
the brainchild of one of history’s more impressive polymaths, should make it hard 
for almost anyone to simply dismiss it.3  Arguably, however, the rhetorical practice 
of Simon made it hard for most economists to not in the end dismiss it, if perhaps 
only discreetly, namely by tacitly refusing to incorporate it in their theoretical work.  
Here, rhetorics is understood in a more authentic manner as the “… art of 
discovering good reasons, finding what really warrants assent, because any 
reasonable person ought to be persuaded” (Booth 1974: xiv; quoted by McCloskey 
1983: 482).  Thus, although Simon certainly wrote as if “any reasonable person ought 
to be persuaded” by his arguments, he did not, I argue, give the “good reasons,” 
those that would “really warrant assent,” for BR.  He failed to persuade.  Most 
importantly, in his most “rhetorical” papers, directly aimed at persuading 
economists, Simon never provided any precise definition of what BR really is.  
Moreover, he never really gave good heuristic advice on to incorporate BR into 
economic models, and simply noted that how exactly notions of BR developed in the 
                                                 
3 Giovanni Dosi (2002) reports that a few years ago, he (and a couple of co-authors) had a paper on 
industrial dynamics rejected from Econometrica, based on a review report, the main conclusion of 
which was that the paper would bring “… back the discussion of industrial change to the Dark Ages 
of Herbert Simon.” Such bluntness is, however, rare.   
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theory of computational complexity   his favorite example of successful modeling 
of BR  would be incorporated into economic models “remain[s] to be seen” (1978: 
12).  These failures form part of the explanation of why most economists, including 
economists of organization, so far have not fundamentally taken BR seriously 
(Section III, “Simon Lecturing Economists on Rationality”).   
 Some implications and wider implications, notably with respect to the future of 
BR in the economics of organization, are finally briefly discussed.  A conclusion is 
that there is reason to be more optimistic on behalf of the use of BR in economic 
reasoning, since there are now better critical and constructive foundations for BR 
than when Simon tried to make economists take BR seriously, as partly signaled by 
the publication of the present book  (Section IV, “Discussion”). 
 
II. Economists’ Use of Bounded Rationality:  
The Case of Organizational Economics 
 
Bounded Rationality in Organizational Economics 
 In his autobiography, Simon (1991a: 270-271) recounts increasingly violent 
disagreements with mainstream economists, leading him to abandon, for a period, 
economics in favor of psychology and computation science.  “By the time I returned 
to a concern with economics in the 1970s,” he observed, “the war was open and 
declared.”  Indeed, many of Simon’s writings from that period (Simon 1976, 1978, 
1979) are so sharply formulated that it seems quite likely that at least Simon himself 
felt that he was part of a war.4 (It is actually harder to find specific and concerted 
critique, at least in print, of Simon and BR, such as one would expect of a genuine 
war).   
                                                 
4 Simon also published in the 1970s on issues that are not directly related to BR, for example, Ijiri and 
Simon (1974) and Seskind and Simon (1973).  
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 However, at exactly the time when the supposed war was going on, an 
important part of economics, namely the theory of the firm, seemed to be 
increasingly influenced by considerations of BR.  New, serious approaches to various 
aspects of the theory of the firm that all appeared to be solidly based on bounded 
rationality were mushrooming. Thus, team theory (Marschak and Radner, 1972), 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1971), and the evolutionary theory of the 
firm (Nelson and Winter, 1973) all appeared in the beginning of the nineteen-
seventies (although their roots go further back).  These, still flourishing, approaches 
all seemed to start from bounded rationality,5 exactly as Simon would like them to.  
And the explicit motivation for such a starting point was that neoclassical theory of 
the firm and its behavioral starting point in substantive rationality excluded concern 
with such vital phenomena as incomplete contracts, the role of organizational 
structure and organizational routines.   
 Today, many  if not all  economists of organization would likely agree that 
BR is important to the study of economic organization (Milgrom and Roberts 1988, 
1992).  Indeed, some argue that it is indispensable, that is, a necessary assumption in 
the theory of economic organization (Williamson 1996; McLeod 2000).  References to 
the need to draw more on psychological research for understanding the workings of 
organization are quite common now, even among the economics profession’s 
foremost symbol manipulators (e.g., Holmström and Tirole 1989; Lazear 1991).  
 Thus, a newcomer to the field may, by glancing at contemporary organizational 
economics, easily get the impression that Simon’s lessons have been absorbed, and 
that organizational economists have acknowledged the need to place BR centerstage 
in their theorizing.  This is not the case.   If anything, the use (or invocation) of BR 
may have declined.6 To some extent this is because the mainstream economics of 
                                                 
5 Albeit rather different conceptions of BR. Thus, BR in team theory is in actuality maximizing with 
costly communication, BR in transaction cost theory is the factor that explains why contracts are 
incomplete, and BR in evolutionary theory is a matter of search.   
6 An impressionistic example: In Williamson’s work, bounded rationality looms larger in Markets and 
Hierarchies (1975) than in The Mechanisms of Governance (1996).  
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organization has developed into a highly formal and axiomatic enterprise, and BR 
has a bad reputation of only being given to formalization if that formalization is 
fundamentally ad hoc and the axiomatic basis is unclear or non-existent. That 
reputation may not be entirely justified (Rubinstein 1998), but many economists of 
organization (particularly contract theorists) certainly act as if it is. Oliver Hart (1990: 
700-1) arguably sums up the attitudes of many formal economists when he argues 
that  
… I do not think that bounded rationality is necessary for a theory of 
organizations.  This is fortunate because developing a theory of bounded 
rationality in a bilateral or multilateral setting seems even more 
complicated than developing such a theory at the individual level; and the 
latter task has already proved more than enough for economists to handle. 
In fact, some parts of the economics of organization, particularly contract theory, 
bear little substantial imprint of BR.7 This is not surprising: Contract theory is based 
entirely on information economics and game theory, which at least in their standard, 
“toolbox versions” have no room for BR at all. Still, even contract theorists 
occasionally invoke BR, usually to explain in a loose way why some contingencies 
may be left out of a contract.     
Bounded Rationality and Transaction Cost Economics  
 It is sometimes argued that transaction cost economics provides considerably 
more room for BR than contract theory (e.g., Brousseau and Fares 2001).  There is 
something to this claim; for example, Williamson (1975) does invoke BR in 
connection with, for example, explaining the M-form, and other aspects of 
organizational structure.  He puts much emphasis on the need for adaptation that 
arises in a world of uncertainty and bounded rationality.  Governance mechanisms in 
                                                 
7 For example, rational expectations are central in most contract theory models. Applying the notion 
(any notion, really) of BR to expectations formation would imply that much contracting would 
produce unintended consequences, producing a need for ex post governance; however, this is not 
explored in contract theory. 
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Williamson’s work are more than efficient (i.e., second-best) ex ante allocations of 
property rights (as in Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990); they are 
mechanisms for ex post adaptation and conflict resolution.  Williamson’s works are 
replete with references to Simon.   
 Still, however, Williamson refrains from being explicit about how to model BR 
on the level of the individual agent.  He is quite explicit here, noting that 
“[e]conomizing on bounded rationality takes two forms.  One concerns decision 
processes and the other involves governance structures. The use of heuristic 
problem-solving … is a decision process response” (Williamson 1985: 46).  However, 
in transaction cost economics, “heuristic problem solving” is not central.  Instead, 
transaction cost economics “ … is principally concerned … with the economizing 
consequences of assigning transactions to governance structures in a discriminating 
way.”8 In other words, Williamson is interested in making use of bounded rationality 
for the purpose of developing a theory of discriminating alignment rather than for 
the purposes of explaining administrative behavior, as in Simon (1947).  He is not 
interested in BR as a “decision process response.”  For the purpose of explaining why 
contracts are incomplete, Williamson apparently thinks that it is not necessary to 
model BR itself; it may be asserted as a “background assumption” that while vital  
indeed, necessary  does not need to be explicated itself.  Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992: 128), as well as most other mainstream economists of organization who invoke 
BR, adopt the same procedure. 
 Thus, BR enters organizational economics reasoning in a loose background sort 
of way, in which it lends credence to exogenously imposing constraints on the 
feasible contracting space, but is not modeled itself.  It supplies the rhetorical 
function of lending intuitive support to the notion of incomplete contracts.  A 
Simonian information processing argument is sometimes invoked in order to be 
more concrete about how BR produces incomplete contracting (Hart 1990: 698; 
                                                 
8 Thus, Simon may be justified in his critique that “… the new institutional economics has not drawn 
heavily from the empirical work in organizations and decision-making for its auxiliary assumptions” 
(Simon 1991b: 27).  See also Simon (1997).   
 6
Schwartz 1992: 80): If agents do not have the mental capacity to think through the 
whole decision tree  for example, in complicated bilateral trading relations , it 
seems reasonable to assume that some of the branches of the tree (such as those 
relating to some future uses of assets) cannot be represented in a contract; the 
contract is left incomplete. This is indeed a BR argument.  However, agents are 
supposed to deal with this manifestation of BR in a substantively rational manner, as 
numerous critics have pointed out since Dow (1987).  As he observed, this approach 
provokes a lurking suspicion of a basic inconsistency, for whereas BR is loosely 
invoked as a background assumption (yet still a necessary one), there is no hesitation 
to appeal to substantive rationality when the choice between governance structures 
must be explained.   I discuss this next.  
The Irrelevance of Bounded Rationality: The Incomplete Contract Controversy 
 A recent theoretical debate on the coherence and foundations of incomplete 
contract theory  called the ”incomplete contract controversy” (Tirole 1999)  is 
pertinent to the issues under consideration here.  The debate concerns whether 
satisfactory foundations for incomplete contracts are offered in the works of Hart and 
associates (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990).  The main critics are 
Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole (Maskin and Tirole 1999; Tirole 1999).  At the core of this 
debate is the explanatory tension between invoking transaction costs   which may 
be understood as a consequence of BR   on the one hand and postulating farsighted 
and substantively rational contracting on the other hand (i.e., the parties to a contract 
can foresee the utilities from the relation). Whereas Dow (1987) interpreted this as an 
inconsistency in transaction cost economics, Maskin and Tirole show that there is no 
formal inconsistency here, and that on this point the incomplete contracts literature 
has got it right.  However, the main thrust of their argument is that the use of 
transaction costs (i.e., BR) in models of incomplete contracting does not provide 
additional explanatory insight relative to models that make no use of these (i.e., 
complete contracting models).  
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 Organizational issues have largely motivated the upsurge in incomplete 
contract modeling during the last decade.  In fact, the founding incomplete contract 
paper, namely Grossman and Hart (1986), was explicitly motivated by an attempt to 
model the emphasis in transaction cost economics on asset specificity as a key 
determinant of the scope of the firm, using modeling conventions and insights 
already developed in (complete contracting) agency theory and its basis in 
mechanism design theory. However, whereas Williamson (1996) puts much 
emphasis on inefficient ex post bargaining, the incomplete contracting approach 
assumes that ex post bargaining is efficient.  Thus, what drives these models are 
misaligned ex ante incentives, particularly with respect to investment in vertical 
buyer-supplier relationships. The problem is to motivate what may cause such 
misalignment. The point of contention in the incomplete contracts controversy is 
whether transaction costs arising from the inability to perfectly anticipate or describe 
all relevant contingencies or enforce contract terms   all of which may derive from 
BR9  constrain the set of feasible contracting outcomes relative to the complete 
contracting benchmark.  If this is not the case, transaction costs (BR) do not suffice to 
establish the possibility of inefficient investment patterns.  Therefore, they do not 
suffice to establish a role for ownership, and in turn for a theory of the boundaries of 
the firm.10   
 The Maskin and Tirole argument builds on the key assumption in the 
incomplete contract approach that although valuations may not be verifiable, they 
may still be observable by the parties (Hart and Moore 1990).  This implies that trade 
can be conditioned on message games between the parties.  These games are 
designed ex ante in such a way that they can effectively describe ex post (where 
bargaining is efficient) all the trades that were not described ex ante.  A further crucial 
step in the argument is the typical contract theory assumption that parties allocate 
property rights and choose investments so that their expected utilities are 
                                                 
9 In the last case (non-verifiability), it is the enforcing party, such as a judge, that is boundedly 
rational.  
10 That is, within the particular set-ups adopted in contract theory. 
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maximized, knowing (at least probabilistically) how payoffs relate to allocations of 
property rights and levels of investment (i.e., they can perform “dynamic 
programming”).  Given this, Maskin and Tirole (1999) provide sufficient conditions 
under which the undescribability of contingencies does not restrict the payoffs that 
can be achieved.  In other words, there are no differences in the allocations that can 
be achieved under incomplete contracting and complete contracting; no real 
economic content is achieved by adding considerations of BR/undescribability of 
contingencies/transaction costs. This is their ”irrelevance of transaction costs” 
theorem.  We might as well call it the “irrelevance of bounded rationality theorem.” 
Bounded Rationality and Mainstream Modeling 
 BR, it has been argued, is very much a background assumption that is 
introduced in order to help explaining in an “intuitive” way incomplete contracting, 
a key ingredient in understanding the efficient boundaries of the firm, and efficient 
alignment more generally. BR is never explicitly modeled on the level of the 
individual agent.  It is never fundamentally taken seriously in the way economists 
take arguments serious, namely by modeling them.  After Maskin and Tirole (1999), 
there would indeed seem to be little reason to take BR seriously at all; its use can at 
best be “rhetorical.”11 
 However, one may argue that it is exactly the very “thin” way in which BR is 
treated in organizational economics that allows for the Maskin and Tirole argument, 
which purportedly demonstrates the complete irrelevance of BR (Kreps 1996; Foss 
2001).  After all, a main notion in incomplete contract theory and transaction cost 
economics that a very thin Simon may join hands with a rather corpulent Savage, as 
it were, and it is not really surprising if the very thin Simon turns out to matter very 
little indeed for the explanatory weight of the whole construct.   
 Still, the puzzle remains why organizational economists have chosen to work 
with models in which BR occupies at best a small corner  of a mainly rhetorical 
                                                 
11 In contract theory courses at American universities, BR is often introduced (and finished) in the 
following manner: “We may use BR as a shorthand for anything that makes a contract incomplete.” 
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nature  of the model, the rest of the space being taken up by common priors, 
dynamic programming, etc.  Not only was Simon critical of, for example, dynamic 
programming (Simon 1978), his work was taken up with rather concrete 
manifestations of BR often explored in detailed computational models (e.g., Newell 
and Simon 1972). Simon himself published prolifically on firms and other 
organizations (e.g., Simon 1949, 1951, 1991, 1997; March and Simon 1958).  Given all 
this, how can it be that organizational economists have been reluctant to be serious 
about BR, in the sense of actually modeling BR?  
 The presumably most obvious reason is because of the well-known difficulties 
of aligning BR with the basic machinery of neoclassical microeconomics and game 
theory (Conlisk 1996; Rabin 1998; Camerer 1998b).  Thus, fundamental notions and 
modeling principles, such as subjective expected utility, common priors, rational 
expectations/dynamic programming, backward induction, etc., are not too easily 
aligned with fundamental findings of cognitive psychology (such as gain-loss 
asymmetries, role-biased expectations, etc.). Moreover, from the mainstream 
economist point of view, there is a huge price to be paid in terms of analytical 
tractability and clarity to the extent that one wishes to factor findings from cognitive 
psychology into economic models. This would seem to be consistent with BR 
becoming increasingly squeezed out of the economics of organization, as the latter 
has become increasingly formalist, the Maskin and Tirole argument being the 
culmination of the squeeze-out operation.  However, this may not be the entire story.  
In the following, I argue that Simon himself is partly responsible for the way in 
which economists have used (rather, not used) BR.   
 
III. Simon Lecturing Economists on Rationality 
 
In a series of papers, Simon (1976, 1978, 1979) made a sustained attempt to convince 
economists to take BR seriously.  Two of these are particularly noteworthy in the 
present context, namely his Richard T. Ely lecture, “Rationality as Process and as a 
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Product of Thought” (Simon 1978) and the Nobel lecture, ”Rational Decision Making 
in Business Organizations” (Simon 1979).  Needless to say, an Ely lecture, held at the 
annual meeting of the American Economic Association, and a Nobel even more, 
represent excellent platforms for persuasion exercises.  It is therefore worth looking a 
bit into these papers.  
The Ely and the Nobel Lectures 
 The lectures differ primarily in the dimensions of depth and broadness, the 
Nobel being more survey-oriented and less analytically engaging.  The similarities 
are, however, much more striking than the differences.  First, they cover much the 
same themes.  Second, both lectures are very strongly rhetorical in a number of 
senses.  Thus, they employ a host of familiar rhetorical devices, such as metaphorical 
reasoning (particularly the Nobel), analogies, reference to authority, and, yes, 
quotations from Alice in Wonderland.  Moreover, the lectures are rhetorical in the 
sense that they are very much taken up with “… probing what men believe they 
ought to believe, rather than prove what is true according to abstract methods” 
(Booth 1974: xiii; cited in McCloskey 1983: 482).   An aspect of this “probing” is that 
the lectures are highly polemical, with much strongcritique of economists such as 
Fritz Machlup, Milton Friedman, Edward Mason and other defenders of the 
neoclassical theory of the firm.  Also, there is indeed no attempt to “prove what is 
true according to abstract methods”; quite the contrary, “abstract methods” 
(axiomatic, non-empirical, etc.) methods are criticized and a rather sturdy elementary 
empiricism is promoted, one that involves ”straightforward ’anthropological’ field 
study” (1978: ). General equilibrium theory is condemned as mere intellectual 
puzzle-solving, it being noted that ”[p]erhaps some of these intellectual mountains 
have been climbed simply because hey were there” (p.493-4).    
   All these aspects are signaled at the beginning of both lectures.  Thus, they 
begin with the traditional opening gambit for talks of this kind, namely invoking 
authorities.  The relevant authorities are Richard Ely and Alfred Marshall.  Citing 
and quoting them is motivated by their taking a different, and more “realistic,” view 
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of economics from the abstract one associated with Lionel Robbins of how to best 
allocate scarce means among competing ends, an understanding that is, of course, 
closely related to the notion of maximizing.   The richer and more realistic view of 
behavior in Marshall and Ely leads directly into the rationality theme.    
 Particularly in the Ely Lecture, Simon handles this is a strikingly rhetorical 
manner. He begins by arguing that indeed most of human behavior has a rational 
element; however, maximizing rationality may not adequately describe this rational 
element.  He then shows that economists in fact do use weaker forms of rationality, 
particularly in connection with institutional issues, where economists are as 
methodologically functionalist as sociologists and anthropologists (transaction cost 
economics is mentioned here). In general, Simon continues, it will not do to separate 
the various human and social sciences on whether they ascribe to rationality to 
human beings or not; they all do  Freudian psychology and sociological social 
exchange theory are provocative mentioned as examples , and economics differs 
only by having adopted a particular, narrow conception of rationality.  In particular, 
economics is not concerned with the process of choice  such as what are effective 
procedures for searching for solutions; only with the results.  However, if attention is 
not in unlimited supply, it is necessary to account for the allocation of attention in 
search processes.  A theory of this is a theory of procedural rationality.  However, 
Simon admits, he is not aware “… that there has been any systematic development of 
a theory of information and communication that treats attention rather than 
information as the scarce resource” (1978: 13). 
 The Nobel Lecture is slightly more specific about concrete manifestations of BR 
than the Ely Lecture.  Here, as in many other places in the two lectures Simon 
employs the mode of argumentation of beginning by criticizing a mainstream 
position and then arguing that the behavioral alternative is superior.  Thus, he begins 
by strongly criticizing the methodological notion (endorsed in economics by 
Machlup and Friedman) that theories can only be tested with respect to their 
predictions of aggregate phenomena. This is a methodologically unsound idea; 
 12
instead, attention should indeed be directed towards the soundness of basic 
assumptions, not the least with respect to behavior.  Moreover, it is insufficient to 
help discriminating between mainstream and behavioral perspectives, as some of the 
central mainstream predictions, notably negatively sloping demand curves and first-
degree homogeneity of production functions – might be as well explained by a 
behavioral theory.   This leads into a lengthy discussion of ”normative decision 
theory,” much of which, quite appropriately for a Nobel Lecture, surveys Simon’s 
own work.  Later in the lecture there are other references to “advances in the 
behavioral theory,” notably the works of Tversky and Kahneman, Simon’s own work 
on the psychology of problem solving, theories of organizational decision-making, 
and various theories of firm organization, such as the work of Nelson and Winter, 
Cyert and March, Degroot, Radner, Leibenstein, Kornai, Williamson, and, rather 
surprising, Baumol’s managerialist theory of the firm (which is entirely based on 
maximization). 
Perspectives on the Lectures   
 In both lectures Simon makes critical and constructive arguments and 
observations.  His main critical targets are the von Neumann/Morgenstern/Savage 
model, game theory, information economics, oligopoly theory, rational expectations 
theory on the level of theory and instrumentalism on the level of methodology.  
These are treated rather harshly.  Thus, of subjective expected utility theory we are 
told  ”… it is hard to take SEU seriously as a theory of actual human behavior in the 
face of uncertainty” (Simon 1978: 9), and of game theory, we are told that it “… is 
embarrassing in the wealth of alternative solutions it offers” (1978: 10).   Not only do 
these involve excesses of rationality, they also may not lead to determinate solutions 
(oligopoly theory is mentioned a number of times as an illustration; see also Simon 
1976).  Simon also offers a number of observations on how bounded rationality has a 
bearing on economic organization, as well as brief surveys of specific work on 
boundedly rational behavior.  
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 With the substantial benefit of hindsight we can discern a number of reasons 
why the rhetorics of Simon’s two lectures failed to convince contemporary (and 
succeeding) economists. Most obviously, Simon’s oeuvre suffered from unusually bad 
timing (hardly his fault, of course).  Thus, the end of the 1970s, the time when Simon 
gave his two key lectures, is the beginning of the information economics-and-game-
theory revolution. Path-breaking work by Arrow, Mirrlees, Stiglitz, Ross, Myersbon, 
Wilson and others was between 5 and 10 years old.  The first statements of contract 
theory were about 5 years old; the revelation principle was almost contemporaneous. 
The first really convincing applications of non-cooperative game theory – 
incidentally to the part of economics, oligopoly theory, that Simon characterized as 
“the permanent and ineracidable scandal of economic theory” (1976: 140)  by 
Spence, Dixit and others were being worked out at about the same time.   Rational 
expectations were moving from being strictly associated with Lucas and Sargent (and 
with specific policy positions), to becoming a generally acceptable modeling tool.  
Etc. Thus, Simon was fighting a battle that even he, in that particular historical 
context, was bound to lose. 
 However, even if the historical context had been more favorable to Simon’s 
arguments, there are still a number of fundamental problems with how Simon tried 
to convince his economist audiences of the soundness of his ideas.  These have to do 
with the lack of definitions of BR, and the lack of modeling heuristics in Simon (1978, 
1979).   Consider these in turn.   
 A fundamental problem which many discussions of BR have pointed to is that 
the concept is defined negatively rather than positively: BR tends to be seen as all 
those aspects of decision-making that substantive rationality is not.  The problems 
with this are, first, that BR only assumes a real existence when viewed against its 
substantively rational counterpart, and, second, that the set of candidates for 
boundedly rational behaviors is without bounds.  Of course, the problem is inherent 
in the name of the concept itself, and Simon may have committed a fundamental 
labeling blunder here.  This may explain why he, from about the mid-1970s used the 
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notion of “procedural rationality” rather than BR, and why he, in fact, uses the 
concept very little in Simon (1978, 1979).   In a disussion of his earlier work, Simon 
(1979: 502) mentions that  
In Administrative Behavior, bounded rationality is largely characterized as a 
residual category – rationality is bounded when it falls short of 
omniscience. … There was needed a more positive and formal 
characterization of the mechanisms of choice under conditions of bounded 
rationality. 
The theory of satisficing search is, of course, one such characterization, and it, as well 
as other instances of behavioral decision theory, is discussed in Simon (1978, 1979).  It 
has often been argued that a basic problem with satisficing search is that there is 
virtually nothing in the theory itself about the merits of alternative search 
procedures, and certainly not in economics.  Simon explicitly argues that in order to 
understand the relative advantages of different procedures, it is necessary to step 
outside of economics, and consider, for example, work on integer programming.  
However, his comments on the subject are extremely vague, and he chooses to “… 
leave the topics of computational complexity and heuristic search with these sketchy 
remarks. What implications these developments in the theory of procedural 
rationality will have for economics … remain to be seen” (1978: 12).   
 Thus, Simon essentially admits that the theoretically developed basis for 
theorizing on satisficing is virtually non-existent, and, at any rate, will likely emerge 
outside of economics.  The conclusion for a listener to these lectures anno 1978 or 
1979 can only be that work based on satisficing search must make use of rules for 
search and postulate aspiration levels that are essentially arbitrary, and at best 
justified by loose empirical considerations of a dubious sociological nature.  In other 
words, Simon’s alternative program would not seem to present any non-arbitrary 
modeling heuristics.   
 It is not surprising, then, that Simon’s economist audience, being first severely 
criticized for their methodical practice and listening to a wholesale condemnation of 
 15
what they likely saw as hot new ideas, then being instructed to take seriously a 
fundamentally undefined notion, and finally being exposed to examples and 
applications of procedural rationality that came close to what they would consider 
sociological reasoning, was not persuaded, and that the use of BR in economics 
remains, at best, rhetorical in a pre-McCloskeyan sense of the word.   
 Could Simon have done it differently, and perhaps more successfully? A 
fundamental problem is that his message was in many ways so radically counter to 
most economists’ ingrained habits of thought, and that they no doubt must have seen 
him as someone who refused to play by the rules of the game.  Arguably, there was 
little Simon could have done, and would have wanted to do, about this.  However, 
he could have done something, such as cutting down on the polemical elements, 
which arguably take up a disproportionate amount of space in the lectures.  More 
importantly, he could have done more to present economists with precise behavioral 
models and the computational models associated with these (Newell and Simon 
1972) in order to more convincingly present the case of a genuine behavioral 
alternative to mainstream modeling of behavior.  It is indeed striking that when 
Simon talks to economists about BR, he is much less specific than when he addresses 
audiences in artificial intelligence and psychology about the same subject.  Perhaps 
he felt that what was necessary was conveying the big idea and not go into formal 
detail (which might not have been appropriate in an Ely or Nobel Lecture anyway).  
That may have been a mistake, for most modern economists like to be told about big 
ideas in a formal manner (the rational expectations revolution and the new growth 
theory comes to mind; Lucas 1972 and Romer 1986 are quite formal pieces, indeed).   
IV. Discussion 
Simon’s Influence on Organizational Economists 
 There can be little doubt that Simon has had a strong influence on many of 
those economists who have directed their analytical efforts towards firms and 
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organizations.  Williamson, Winter and Radner immediately come to mind.12  When 
various economics approaches to firms and organizations began to emerge in the 
beginning of the 1970s, Simon’s fundamental work on the subject was already two to 
three decades old (Simon 1945, 1951; March and Simon 1958).  For some of the 
pioneers it was natural to look to Simon’s work for inspiration, perhaps particularly 
those who stressed the routinized nature of firm behavior (i.e., Nelson and Winter 
1973).  Bounded rationality seemed to link up directly with the notion of routines, 
since these may be interpreted as firm-level equivalents to individual behavioral 
rules that are adopted to reduce complexity under bounded rationality.  To others 
the contribution of Simon’s thought lies elsewhere and is, in a sense, less direct.   
Thus, what Williamson appears to have gained from Simon is, first of all, a rationale 
for incomplete contracting, and, second, the notion that institutional choice is 
discrete (see Simon 1978).   Although he is, of course, familiar with Simon’s work in 
economics from the 1950s which is taken up with actually modeling boundedly 
rational behavior (e.g., Simon 1955), it is the Simon of the 1978 lecture  the 
interdisciplinary Simon who goes into institutional choice as a discrete one at 
considerable length13  that seems to loom largest in Williamson’s thinking.  As 
mentioned earlier he explicitly dissociates himself from understanding economizing 
with BR in terms of, for example, heuristic problem solving.  
 It is notable that those economists that have been able to utilize aspects of 
Simon’s thought in their work on economic organization were graduate students in 
the 1950s and early 1960s when Simon’s influence was perhaps more readily felt, and 
when he was around for interaction.  In contrast, the works of those theorists of 
economic organization who began to publish from the mid-1970s are arguably much 
less, and usually not at all, influenced by Simon.  One reason why this is so is simply 
that they were busy assimilating, applying and extending the new information 
                                                 
12 For a brief essay on the Simon-Williamson relation, see Augier and March (2001).  
13 Incidentally, Simon (1978) presents this theme as somehow intimately connected with BR, and 
mentions that discrete institutional choice is at variance with marginalism.  While discreteness in 
choice indeed may require other tools (notions of complementarity and the underlying mathematical 
lattice theory) than conventional marginalist ones, it is entirely consistent with mainstream economics.  
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economics and game theory tools when Simon presented his fundamental ideas to 
economists, and that Simon’s vision was simply too far from what they were up to.  
A part of that explanation, however, is that the Simon papers they were likely to 
know would be his two end-of-the-1970s papers.  And, as has been argued, there is 
very little in these papers that may instruct economists wanting to build a BR 
research program in the economics of organization about the exact nature of BR and 
how to go about doing it.  His later papers are equally barren in this respect.  Thus, 
one of his last papers on organizational issues (Simon 1991) surprisingly does not go 
into BR at all, but mostly takes issue with various themes in organizational 
economics, notably the assumption of opportunism.   This has arguably contributed 
to the absence of a distinct BR research program in the economics of organization.  
The Future of Bounded Rationality in the Theory of Economic Organization 
So, what will happen to Simon’s Grand Theme of BR in the theory of economic 
organization? Will it gradually disappear, as contract theory takes over the whole 
field, everybody realizing that what some theorists try to say using BR may be said 
more elegantly with notions of asymmetric information, drawing on standard 
methodology?  Although this may have been a reasonable prediction, say, 10 years 
ago, there are reasons to think that the situation is different now.   
First of all, the evidence from psychology and experimental economics about 
the relative failures of expected utility theory is now so large that it cannot be 
ignored. Although various findings that are contradictory to EU theory were 
certainly well known at the time Simon gave this lectures, the amount of findings 
today is many times larger (Camerer 1998), and the scientific quality of the relevant 
experimental methods is superior.  There is, in other words, a much better critical 
foundation for BR. 
Second, there is now a much improved positive foundation for theories of BR.  
Economists do not have to look at (at least to them) esoteric branches of 
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computational theory or AI.14 In the fields of psychology and decision theory, 
perhaps closer neighbors to economics than AI, theorists and experimentalists have 
been at work since the end of the 1970s trying to align some aspects of BR with EU 
theory or develop distinct alternatives to EU theory (see Camerer 1998 for a fine 
survey and discussion).  While economists may still be uncertain or ignorant about 
alternatives to EU theory  one wonders how many economists are familiar with 
cumulative prospect theory with rank-dependent weights which Camerer (1998: 166) 
singles out as the best alternative to EU theory in the light of the evidence  at least 
they may be increasingly alert to the new alternatives.     
Third, within mainstream contract theory, the Maskin and Tirole paper (Maskin 
and Tirole 1999) is not taken to be the last word about BR (and Maskin and Tirole do 
not appear to think of it in this way, either). Rather, it may be taken as a contribution 
that demonstrates the inherent limitations of a certain class of models (Kreps 1996), 
and points to the need to overcome these limitations, possibly by means of 
sophisticated treatments of BR (see Segal 1999).  However, it is far from clear how to 
incorporate BR in contract theory.  A main problem is that BR threatens to drastically 
complicate the link between current actions (e.g., investments) and anticipations of 
future payoffs, because BR is hard to square with the rational expectations of these 
payoffs. There is no BR theory of expectations (as far as I know) and although 
notions of satisficing may perhaps be invoked, we are up against the usual problem 
that virtually anything can be postulated to be a reasonable aspiration level.  Still, 
there are other uses for BR within contract theory, such as understanding the 
limitations of hold-up (Carmichael and McLeod 1999) and providing more refined 
understanding of why contracts are incomplete than merely postulating this by fiat 
(Mookerjee 1998; Segal 1999; McLeod 2000). 
 Fourth, writers associated with transaction cost economics have increasingly 
begun to look into the BR component of the approach.  Thus, Williamson (1998) 
                                                 
14 However, it should be mentioned that various computational approaches have been very usefully 
applied in the context of the theory of the firm by a number of evolutionary economists. See, for 
example, Marengo et al. (2000).  Also, game theorists have made much use of AI notions of BR (see 
discussion and references in Lipman 1995). 
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himself has put forward a possible modeling strategy for how to incorporate richer 
notions of BR in transaction cost economics.  He argues that the many ramifications 
of bounded rationality should be explored with a view to first identify those 
regularities in decision-making that differ from the classical model of von Neumann-
Morgenstern-Savage, then work out the implications of these regularities for efficient 
organization, and finally fold these into the organizational design. The implication is 
that the efficiency questions of the economics of organization may usefully be 
reformulated, relying on more elaborate models of BR, so that “… organization can 
and should be regarded as an instrument for utilizing varying cognitive and 
behavioral propensities to best advantage” (1998: 12). A limitation of Williamson’s 
(1998) paper (if not of the program he sketches) is that he seems mostly intent on 
demonstrating that findings of cognitive psychology are entirely consistent with 
“[t]he transaction cost economics triple for describing human actors  bounded 
rationality, farsighted contracting, and opportunism.”  Therefore, he is not very 
specific about what exactly to do with these findings.   However, Foss (2001) sketches 
various ways in which findings from the bias and heuristics literature may be 
utilized in transaction cost economics.  The main idea is to interpret these findings as 
potential sources of transaction cost problems (e.g., contribution biases may increase 
bargaining costs) and argue that such problems influence the choice of governance 
structure. 
 These ideas have been criticized by Loasby (2002) who argues that they 
continue an unfortunate tendency in most of organizational economics to only look 
at organization as something that exist in order to avoid the negative aspects and 
consequences of human behavior and not to stimulate the positive ones.  There is 
certainly something to this critique.  Transaction cost economics needs to address 
how governance choice influences alternative methods of search and learning.  A 
recent, very interesting attempt at building a theory of this is Nickerson and Zenger 
(2002).  Relying on complexity theory, they argue that Simonian heuristic search, 
which is usually necessary for problems that involve many, highly interdependent 
knowledge sets, is likely to require to substantial knowledge sharing and ongoing 
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interaction of knowledge sets.  However, this exposes those who control the relevant 
knowledge sets to various knowledge exchange hazards (e.g., the Arrowian paradox 
of information).   Because firm organization makes such hazards less severe and also 
better enables the building of a specialized language in terms of which the relevant 
communication may take place, complex problem-solving requiring heuristic search 
will be organized inside firms.  Simpler problems, which may be decomposed into 
subproblems, and correspondingly simpler search, may be well organized by market 
governance.  Thus, Nickerson and Zenger elegantly combine key ideas from Simon 
(notably Simon 1962) with key transaction cost economics ideas in a theory of how 
governance structures both avoid the negative and promote the positive.    
 
V. Conclusions 
This paper has treated BR as a mainly rhetorical part of the practice of organizational 
economists.  Thus, BR is invoked in a loose, intuitive manner to explain more central 
concepts, notably incomplete contracting, but it is not itself treated in much detail; it 
is not defined and modeled in any precise manner.  I also argued that this practice 
may be related to the fact that Simon never really explained, at least to his economist 
audiences, what BR is, how it may be modeled so that it may be of use to economists, 
and how exactly BR impact on those issues that interests economists of organization 
(i.e., existence, boundaries and internal organization of firms; contract design).   
Thus, although the study of economists’ rhetorical practice may be helpful for 
illuminating aspects of scientific development, it has also been suggested that there 
are limits to the role of rhetoric in scientific development.  At least, rhetoric in the 
sense of mere eloquence is not sufficient, because the successes of persuasion 
attempts are highly context-dependent. Thus, although Simon in his two major 
attempts to win economists over to the behavioral side (Simon 1978, 1979), exhibited 
rather considerable eloquence he failed to persuade, arguably because the context 
was so unfavorable to his arguments.  However, that context has changed.  Had 
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Simon given his Ely and Nobel in, say, 2001 and 2002 he would have found 
considerably more receptive audiences than he did in 1978 and 1979.    
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